Politics, Economics and the European Union by Holly, Patrick, Jr. \u2799
The Park Place Economist
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 12
1998
Politics, Economics and the European Union
Patrick Holly Jr. '99
Illinois Wesleyan University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Holly, Patrick Jr. '99 (1998) "Politics, Economics and the European Union," The Park Place
Economist: Vol. 6
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol6/iss1/12
Politics, Economics and the European Union
Abstract
The development of what is now termed the European Union (EU) into an unparalleled world trading bloc is
a powerful case study in the trials and tribulations of achieving economic harmony among many countries. It
is also a testament to the amount of time and work involved in achieving this economic oneness, for we have
seen this kind of effort in the formation of another cohesive economic unit, —the United States.
Keywords
history of the European Union, transition to national currency
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol6/iss1/12
The Park Place Economist / vol. VI
Politics, Economics and the European Union
Patrick Holly, Jr.
Ever since Winston Churchill called for a
United States of Europe in 1946, European political
and governmental figures have been enamored with
the idea of living on common economic ground.  The
end of World War II, the Marshall Plan for European
reconstruction of 1947, and the ensuing Organization
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) gave
them a preliminary opportunity and opened the door
for further collaboration.  But it was the creation of
the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and
the Treaty of Rome establishing a full fledged
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 that
virtually guaranteed the opportunity for an eventual
economic and monetary union.  These events lie at
the beginning of what has become a grand scheme to
create a single European economic machine.  For
certain, the development of what is now termed the
European Union (EU) into an unparalleled world
trading bloc is a powerful case study in the trials and
tribulations of achieving economic harmony among
many countries.  It is also a testament to the amount
of time and work involved in achieving this economic
oneness, for we have seen this kind of effort in the
formation of another cohesive economic unitthe
United States.  Indeed, our own economic beginnings
as a group of thirteen colonies can be equated to those
of the EU, as both groups have gone through similar
problems and now share many economic
characteristics.1
The signing of the treaty of Rome in 1957 laid
the groundwork for a new era in European economics
by formally declaring a European Economic
Community (EEC) that would work together to
harmonize the various economies of Europe.  Among
others, its goals included: (a) The elimination of
customs duties and quantitative restrictions on the
import and export of goods among Member States;
(b) a common commercial policy; and (c) an internal
market characterized by the abolition...of obstacles to
the free movement of goods, persons, services, and
capital.2  (We shall see later that these goals have been
expanded to include a single currency.)  These goals
and others were to be achieved through a governing
body not all that different from the United States in
terms of structure.  Provisions for a Parliament, a
Council, a Commission, a Court of Justice, and a Court
of Auditors were made to separate the duties of the
EEC.  These bodies still exist today.
The European Parliaments primary
responsibility is similar to that of the U.S. Congress
it is the lawmaking body of the Union and oversees
the construction and adoption of Union acts.  The
European Council oversees and aids in the
coordination of the general economic policies of
member states.  The European Commission ensures
that the provisions of the treaty are applied and
formulates recommendations on matters within the
Treaty.  It has no equal in the world.  The Court of
Justice is present to ensure that the correct
interpretation and application of the Treaty is observed.
Finally, the Court of Auditors regulates Member States
by researching their actions to assure compliance with
the Treaty and its goals.  It does this primarily through
observations of revenues and expenditures of the EEC
and of the individual Member States.  (The U.S.
structural equivalents, barring the Commission, would
be Congress, the Presidency, the Judicial System, and
the IRS respectively.)
As you can see, the Treaty of Rome designed
a governmental structure similar to the U.S., complete
with a clearly defined separation of powers amid a
centralized body.  It is no surprise that the framers of
the Treaty chose a more centralized body.  While there
is no doubt that most of the countries in Europe are
more socialistic than the U.S., history has also shown
through the failure of the Articles of Confederation
(the first U.S. government) that a severely
decentralized system fails to adequately aid in the
allocation of funds, the managing of interest rates, and
the creation of a common commercial and tariff policy
for a large group of independent states.3
One of the primary mechanisms through which
the Treaty of Rome chose to manage transition toward
an intertwined European economy was the European
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Investment Bank (EIB).  The task of the European
Investment Bank, the European Unions financing
institution, is to contribute towards the integration,
balanced development and economic and social
cohesion of the Member Countries.  To this end, it
raises on the markets substantial volumes of funds
which it directs...towards financing capital projects
according with the objectives of the Union.4  In other
words, the EIB was created to balance the economies
of the Member States by encouraging investment in
the poorer countries.
As time wore on after the Treaty of Rome was
signed, there grew a desire and a
need for a common monetary
policy complete with monetary
integration.  As early as 1962,
the Marjolin memorandum
pointed out that, whereas the
Treaty of Rome had foreseen a
common trade policy, it had not
envisaged a common monetary
policy; it was felt that this lacuna
should be filled.5  Since the
Treaty of Rome subjected
exchange rates for Member States
to narrow fluctuation margins,
this memorandum revealed that
after a period of transition, it would be necessary to
fix exchange rates and head towards a single currency
before the management of the various currencies
became too difficult.6  A similar sentiment spread
across the U.S. when the Articles of Confederation was
still law.  Every state having its own currency was
becoming cumbersome, leading to a difficulty in
maintaining the exchange rates between states for
lengthened periods of time.  It also made intrastate
trade more difficult than it needed to be.7  This
movement, however, lost momentum in the mid-1970s
in Europe due to divergent policy responses to the
economic shocks of the period (ie: OPEC, Fall of
Bretton Woods, etc).
January of 1979 saw the revival of the
movement towards a single currency with the creation
of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the
European Currency Unit (ECU).  Then, in June of
1988, the European Council confirmed monetary and
economic union as an EEC objective and appointed
the president of the European Commission, Jaques
Delors, to study and propose stages leading to this
union.  Their research proposed that complete
economic and monetary union should be achieved in
three evolutionary steps:
Stage One represents the initiation of the process of
creating an economic and monetary union.
Stage Two is the period of transition to the third and
final stage, during which the basic organs of the union
will be set up, most notably the European System of
Central Banks (ESCB).
Stage Three commences with the move to irrevocably
locked exchange rates and the
introduction of a single currency.
The ESCB becomes responsible
for monetary policy and
exchange rate management,
among other things.
As of 1994, the EU has been in
Stage Two of this process.  Stage
Three is slated to begin no later
than 1999 and is to be in full force
with the euro as a single currency
by the year 2002.
The proposition of these stages
and the declaration of monetary
union created the necessity to revise the Treaty of
Rome.  The resulting negotiations formed the Treaty
on European Union, signed in Maastricht on February
7, 1992.  This treaty expanded the role of the Treaty
of Rome to include provisions for monetary union and
effectively renamed the EEC the European Union
(EU).  It outlined goals to: (a) fix exchange rates on
the way to common currency; (b) develop close
coordination among Member State economic policies;
and (c) coordinate a single monetary and fiscal policy
for the entire EU.
The Treaty on European Union also
establishes protocol on the European Monetary
Institute (EMI) and the ESCB.  The former (which is
now in force) is primarily a buffer between Stages One
and Three, and is to be liquidated at the onset of Stage
Threethe start of the ESCB and the introduction of
the euro as a currency.  Thus, the EMI and the ESCB
will never coexist.  The EMI is present as an advisor
for policy coordination, but does not have any active
involvement in monetary policy operations.  It carries
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than the U.S. without
economic harmony
and a single currency
because its countries
were never under one
government.
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out its tasks primarily through persuasion.  Its other
primary responsibility is outlining the framework for
carrying out a single monetary policy in Stage Three.
It is this duty that will allow a smooth transition to the
ESCB.  The ESCB will assume powers comparable
to those of the Federal Reserve System of the United
States.
As the EEC became more stable and mature,
its popularity among non-member states grew
substantially.  This was the reason the Treaty on
European Union also established several conditions
that were to be met before a nation could join the
Monetary Union: (a) The inflation rate must not exceed
by more than 1.5 percentage points the average rate
of the three community nations with the lowest rate;
(b) its budget deficit must not exceed 3 percent of its
GDP and its overall government debt 60 percent of its
GDP; (c) long-term interest rates must not exceed by
more than two points the average interest rate of the
three countries with the lowest inflation rates; and (d)
its average exchange rate must not fall by more than
2.25 percent of the average of the EMS for the two
years before joining.8
After continued interest in membership and
continued growth in scope, it was determined that the
Treaty on European Union needed further revision.
These revisions combined to produce the Treaty of
Amsterdam.  Basically, this treaty, signed on June 17,
1997, makes minor amendments to the Treaty on
European Union, updating it for the 21st century and
preparing it for the allowance of a wealth of new
members.  Included in the revisions are the following:
(a) A clear statement of intent towards a single
currency; (b) a declaration of intent for a common
defense policy; (c) declaration of a common foreign
and security policy for the entire EU; (d) declaration
of political solidarity; and (e) declaration of the need
for the necessary social security programs to provide
freedom of movement for workers.9  This fine tuning
affords the EU a greater means by which to achieve
economic cohesiveness.  It is interesting to point out
that when the U.S. Constitution was framed, all of these
goals and expectations were present10, with the
exception of  the necessity of social programs.
(Although that difference has more to do with politics
than with economics.)
Coinciding with the provisions of the Treaty
of Amsterdam was a separate doctrine called Agenda
2000.  Revealed on July 16, 1997, it promoted
extensive expansion and rigorous monitoring of the
policies of the EU.  According to European
Commission president Jacques Santer, It is a strategy
for strengthening growth, competitiveness and
employment...and for extending the Unions borders
through enlargement eastward toward the Ukraine,
Belarus and Moldava.11 The doctrine recommends,
among other things, that accession negotiations start
with Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic
and Slovenia.  Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania,
and Slovakia will be invited to join soon.  The Agenda
plans to maintain its strength amidst this aggressive
expansion through further institutional reform and a
review of the Commissions organization and
operation, development of internal policies for growth,
employment, and quality of life, and maintaining
economic and social cohesion through more effective
structural funds.  As a sidenote, this doctrine could be
seen as a quasi-European version of the Monroe
Doctrine and Manifest Destiny, although these
American declarations were motivated more by greed
than by economic virtue.
The EU of today is the largest free-trade
association in the world.  It boasts 15 Member States
with more on the way, and is well prepared to face the
next century.  The comparisons of its growth to that of
the early U.S. are substantial, if not perfect.  The
economic plight of the original thirteen colonies under
the Articles of Confederation mirrored that of Europe
before W.W.II.  Europe lasted longer without economic
harmony and a single currency, however, because the
separate countries were never under a single
government.  Regardless, the similarities in their
exchange rate problems, their common commercial
policy yearnings, their tariff problems, and their
governmental structural design (among others) forces
a  notable comparison.  The question that remains is
whether Europe will take that extra step in a few
decades towards a single government to compliment
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It was asserted previously that the structural
development of the European Union was very similar
to that of the United States, both economically and
politically.  But this comparison ends when observing
the economic climates in which these two have
developed.  Whereas the economic environment under
which the U.S. grew was secluded from the rest of the
world, the respective environment that the EU has
grown under has been open and global.  As a result, it
can be said that the closed economy of the U.S. made
it easier to coordinate the various currencies that
existed at the time when the move to a single currency
took place.  Coupled with the fact that the technology
of the time didnt allow for as rapid a transfer of money,
the states of the Union and the U.S. Federal government
didnt have to worry significantly about speculative
attacks throughout the process.  The EU, however, is
influenced greatly by the technology-ridden, open and
global economy that persists today.  Consequently, its
development plans for the move to a single currency
have been made more complex, both in terms of politics
and economic theory.  The fine line between economics
and politics has become considerably blurred to a much
larger extent than that of the U.S. in the early 1800s.
It will be seen that the decisions reached on the
provisions of monetary union have been based on large
political compromise just as much as economic theory,
and that these decisions are still being debated.
Because of the volatile nature of todays
market, a move to a single currency is very risky and
complicated.  This complication led to the previously
mentioned Delors Report, which proposed in 1988
that economic and monetary union should be achieved
in these three steps, explained in further detail here:
Stage One represents the initiation of the process of
creating a monetary union.  It would aim at a greater
convergence of economic performance through the
strengthening of economic and monetary co-
ordination.  It began on 1 July 1990 and terminated at
the onset of Stage Two on 1 January 1994
Stage Two is the period of transition to the third and
final stage, during which the basic organs and structure
of the union will be established and prepared by the
European Monetary Institute (EMI).  This stage will
end on 1 January 1999 at the onset of Stage Three
and the liquidation of the EMI.
Stage Three commences with the move to irrevocably
locked exchange rates and the introduction of a single
currency to replace all EU member national currencies.
Simultaneously, the European System of Central
Banks (ESCB) assumes control for formulation and
implementation of monetary policy, exchange rate
management, and the maintenance of a properly
functioning payment system.  More will be mentioned
about the EMI and the ESCB later.
At the onset of Stage Three, the national currencies
and the euro will become different expressions of what
is essentially the same currency.  In other words,
national currencies and the euro will coexist
interchangeably for a period of three years.  At the
end of these three years (1 January 2002) the ESCB
will begin the process of overtaking the national
currencies.  At the latest, six months after the onset of
the national currency buyout, national banknotes and
coins will lose their legal tender status.
There is still much debate concerning this
approach to monetary union, for many believe that it
should not be gradual, but instead instantaneous.
There are very few successful processes of monetary
unification that (have) proceeded gradually...Some
economists have argued that this strategy of slow
convergence of the inflation rate in the high inflation
countries to those of the low inflation countries is risky,
and in the end may fail to bring inflation rates to
equality.13  The reasoning behind this is as follows.
It is unlikely that the authorities of high inflation
countries can convince speculators and other economic
agents that they are as mindful of inflation as the
authorities of low inflation countries.  Speculators
Politics, Economics and the European Union
PART TWO
The different regions of the
European Union are a patchwork of
distinct cultures, languages, histories and
traditions.  They are also
characterized by different levels of income, and
therefore cannot
offer all citizens equivalent opportunitiesthe 10
most prosperous
regions in the EU are three times as rich, and they
invest three times
as much in their economic fabrics as the 10
poorest.12
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power makes this assertion more concrete.  The high-
inflation country that is attempting to converge will
face high nominal interest rates because their inflation
expectations decline slowly.14  Since the exchange rate
is fixed, this creates an opportunity for speculators to
take advantage of short term capital inflows (i.e.. high
inflation countrys currency is cheap and attractive to
other countries).  This capital
inflow...tends to increase the
domestic currency money
supply stock of the high
inflation country, making it all
the more difficult to follow an
anti-inflationary policy.15
This reasoning is also used to
assert that it would be easier for
member countries to satisfy the
convergence criteria set by the
Maastricht Treaty after
monetary union has taken
place.  The convergence criteria
will be outlined later.
These arguments could
lead one to believe that it is
better to converge economies
immediately in order to avoid a loss of credibility.  But
this is where the politics of the situation enter.  It is
conceivable that governments might use an extra year
or two to deregulate, free up sclerotic labour markets
and make their economies more competitive; but they
are just as likely to seize the excuse to slow down
politically painful measures.16 Because governments
and constituencies might not respond well to the
potential shocks of an immediate changeover
whether because they will not be popular politically
or they will not be easy to overcome economically
most have demanded a transition over time.  Indeed,
many European countries have been plagued with high
unemployment as of late.  An immediate change could
temporarily make situations worse for the voting
constituency of these countries, whereas a gradual
transition could allow governments to ease their pain.
As a result, politics has won over what may be a better
economic plan.
The role of the EMI and the ensuing ESCB
will be all important to this political decision.  The
EMI will be acting as a bridge between Stage One
and Stage Three, and has two main tasks: (a) to
contribute towards the convergence of the main
macroeconomic indicators; and (b) to make required
preparations for the establishment of the ESCB and
the conduct of a single monetary policy under a single
currency.  The EMI is not a central bank and cannot
conduct monetary policy, but it has considerable power
in that it will largely research and define the role of
the ESCB and its duties.  To
this end it is the perfect political
tool for the gradual formation
of a single monetary unitit
buys a lot of time for the
various member governments.
Because the EMI reports
regularly to the Commission of
the EU, those governments are
given constant updates on what
to expect from the ESCB, so as
to be given enough time to
prepare.  When all is said and
done, the ESCB will be
dictating monetary policy and
monitoring exchange rates,
among other duties, while
maintaining a status similar to
that of the Federal Reserve System of the U.S.  The
ESCB will also oversee and conduct the currency
changeover to the euro.  As we can see, the EMI will
be an incredibly useful buffer between Stage One and
Stage Three, and will assure a gradual institutional
transition to coincide with its gradual monetary
transition.
Again, it can be mentioned here that this is
where the similarities between the economic
development of the U.S. and the EU differ.  The U.S.,
as a result of its closed economy, did not concern itself
with building a time bridge between the individual
state policies and one national policy, because the
opportunity for speculation was smallthe closed
economy eliminated the political intuition for a gradual
change.  As a result, the first National Bank of the
U.S. was formed and took over almost overnight.
Granted the first National Bank failed, but that was
more because of political opposition to the idea of a
national bank than a transition failure.17 Thus, we can
see that the EUs exposure to large amounts of potential
speculation at the hands of a currency change has
created the political (although some would probably
Holly
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add economic) environment for a gradual
changeoverlegislators in the EU and its member
countries are  more concerned about pleasing
constituents because the potential for transition
problems is greater with an open economy.
To further assure that a gradual transition does
occur, the EU has established various convergence
criteria that potential and current member countries
must adhere to in order to participate in the monetary
union.  Those criteria are defined and explained here:
Price stabilitydefined as a rate of inflation that lies
within 1.5 percentage points of the three best
performing EU countrieswill be necessary for the
onset of Stage Three and the move to irrevocably fixed
exchange rates, especially during the three-year
transition when both national currencies and the euro
will co-exist.  If a country has wild fluctuations in
inflation, it will disrupt the fixed exchange rate
equilibrium and force the rest of the EU to experience
the same fluctuations.
Low long-term interest ratesdefined as within two
percentage points of the three lowest scoring EU
countriesare also a key criteria.  The previously
mentioned argument relating to capital inflows and
how they make it difficult for a high-inflation country
to follow anti-inflationary policy explains why this
criterion is present.
Exchange rate stabilitydefined as a country
keeping within the normal fluctuation margins of
Europes exchange rate mechanism for at least two
yearsis also required.  It remains obvious that the
move to an irrevocably fixed exchange rate will require
the stable exchange rates of potential and current
members.  If exchange rates fluctuate wildly during
transition when the euro and national currencies co-
exist, that means that price levels are changing [Q=(P*/
P)S].  This leads us back to the inflation criteria
explanation above.
A sustainable government financial position
which is defined as either a budget deficit no higher
than 3% of that countrys GDP, or a ratio of public
debt to GDP of no more than a reference value of
60%is the final criterion.  It can be reasoned that a
cap on government spending will largely help to
prevent inflation, which again leads us back to the first
criterion.  Indeed, German finance minister Theo
Waigel felt that a country might qualify to join the
euro only to revert, once inside, to its former profligate
borrowing. 18  Waigel said that this phenomenon
would undermine a single currency and concluded that
government spending and borrowing limits are proper
for admittance into the EU.
The current member countries of the EU must satisfy
these conditions by the start of Stage Three on 1
January 1999.  Any other countries satisfying these
criteria by this date may also apply for EU membership
and for participation in the monetary union.  Also
implicit within this set of criteria is the principle that
not all potential members have to join the monetary
union at the same time.  Thus, it is further stressed
that these criteria are flexible within a reasonable
margin.
It is the third and final criterion that has created
the most controversy, largely because some assert that
budgetary norms are not related to the workings of a
monetary union.  Countries have to follow sustainable
fiscal policies irrespective of the monetary regime.  The
sustainability of deficits and debt is required whether
a country has a floating exchange rate or a fixed one,
whether it is in a monetary union or not.19  The
primary argument here is that the separate
governments of the EU have agendas aside from the
EU that they have freedom and the necessity to pursue.
It can be interpreted that this final criterion infringes
upon the individual governments rights and abilities
to pursue other fiscal agendas that may or may not be
related to the EU and that countrys own economic
policy.  Again, we see here that politics have entered
the arena and threatened to inhibit what may be a sound
economic criterion, assuming of course that the
convergence criteria are economically sound.  And let
us not forget that the convergence criteria in general
were created for political reasons just as much as they
were for economic reasons.  It is certain that Mr.
Waigels statements about profligate spending by
poorer countries of the EU were just as much political
as they were economical, for the big, stable countries
of the union such as Germany are also looking out for
the economic well-being of their constituents.
The economic and political development of the
EU has made for an interesting case study in the
differences between the two.  It can certainly be seen
here that what may be practical economically is not
always practical politically and vice versa.  This is a
debate that has plagued the EU for decades and will
Politics, Economics and the European Union
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continue to do so in the years to come.  Indeed, what
will be interesting to observe as the EU progresses
forward is how much one wins over the other, and
what effect that will have on not just economic
advances, but on advances in the governmental
structure and the possible expansion of the EUs sphere
of influence.
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